Jumping Off the Merry-Go-Round: How the Federal Courts Will Reconcile the Circular Deference Problem Between HIPAA and FOIA by Cameron, Catherine J.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 58 
Issue 2 Winter 2009 Article 2 
2009 
Jumping Off the Merry-Go-Round: How the Federal Courts Will 
Reconcile the Circular Deference Problem Between HIPAA and 
FOIA 
Catherine J. Cameron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Catherine J. Cameron, Jumping Off the Merry-Go-Round: How the Federal Courts Will Reconcile the 
Circular Deference Problem Between HIPAA and FOIA, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 333 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol58/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ARTICLES
JUMPING OFF THE MERRY-GO-ROUND: HOW THE
FEDERAL COURTS WILL RECONCILE THE
CIRCULAR DEFERENCE PROBLEM BETWEEN
HIPAA AND FOIA
Catherine J Cameron+
I. IN TRO D UCTION ........................................................................................... 333
II. HISTORY OF APPLICABLE HIPAA SECTIONS, HHS REGULATIONS,
AND FO IA PROVISIONS ................................................................................... 338
III. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN HIPAA AND
F O IA ............................................................................................................... 34 2
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN HIPAA AND STATE OPEN RECORDS LAWS .......... 344
V. CASE LAW INTERPRETING EXEMPTION SIX TO THE FEDERAL FOIA ......... 349
VI. How THE COURT WILL RESOLVE THE CONFLICT .................................... 352
V II. C ONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 358
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 2007, the Washington Post published a series of reports over
two days documenting the degenerating conditions of Walter Reed Army
Medical Center in Washington, D.C., one of the military's chief recuperation
centers for soldiers wounded in the military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.' These articles, highlighting the poor medical care, patient neglect, and
deplorable sanitary conditions at Walter Reed, led to the dismissal of many of
the hospital's top brass.2 Because of these articles, Congress and the Presidentcalled for a system-wide review and upgrade of medical care for the country's
+ Assistant Professor of Legal Skills at Stetson University College of Law; J.D., M.A. in Mass
Communication and B.S. in Journalism, all from the University of Florida. The author would like
to thank her research assistants, Jessica Yeary and Amber Cornwell, for their outstanding research
efforts for this Article, and her many colleagues at Stetson who helped her refine this Article.
1. Dana Priest & Anne Hull, Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army's Top Medical
Facility, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2007, at Al; see also Anne Hull & Dana Priest, The Hotel
Aftermath, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2007, at Al.
2. Peter Baker, At Walter Reed, Bush Offers an Apology, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, at
Al.
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veterans.3 Notably, these stories were based solely on interviews with patients,
their families, and Walter Reed personnel, not hospital records.4
Writing stories based solely on personal interviews is not usually the
preferred method of fact checking by reporters at major news organizations.
Generally, most news organizations prefer to verify information gleaned from
personal interviews by checking independent documentation, when available.
5
For seasoned reporters of medical and health-related news, the lack of citation
to records from the hospital came as no surprise-reporters have had virtually
no access to hospital records since the enactment of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).6 The Washington Post
certainly would have had a stronger story if its reporters could have
documented average wait times for medical care, average numbers of
misdiagnoses, and medical problems that may have been caused by unsanitary
conditions; but this was not a possibility because of the closure of these records
under HIPAA.7
Perhaps HIPAA would not be such a frustrating obstacle to medical
reporters seeking medical records from government if it did not conflict with
state and federal open records laws.8 Since the enactment of HIPAA, there has
been much confusion of the statute's intersection with state and federal
3. Id.
4. Priest & Hull, supra note 1.
5. See Maria Trombly, To Check, Or Not to Check?, QUILL, May 2004, at 19 (noting that a
fact checker who had worked at Fortune and the Columbia Journalism Review normally "would
ask to see all the supporting materials"); see also Robert Niles, How to Report a News Story
Online, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/wiki/reporting/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) ("Documents also
provide a great way to fact-check statements made by an interview subject.").
6. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.); Gil Shochat, HIPAA Hinders Access to Medical Information, THE NEWS MEDIA &
THE LAW, Spring 2003, at 12 (documenting several news stories in which reporters had to request
records from a non-medical source to report on matters of public importance).
7. Developments in the Law-The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 990, 1055 (2007).
8. It was argued in the "Developments in the Law" section of the February 2007 Harvard
Law Review that the chance of a HIPAA-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) conflict is minimal
because, when both statutes are implicated by a records request, a conflict will not often arise, and
if it does, the records will most likely be open under FOIA. Id at 1064 & n.69. This argument is
based on an analysis by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that indicates there
are not many records that would fall under the definition of both statutes, and those records that
do would clearly be controlled by FOIA because of language in HHS regulations promulgated to
implement the rule. Id. But as this Article demonstrates, the analysis may not be that easy.
Despite the seeming acquiescence of HHS to FOIA controlling the status of a record that falls
within the definitions of both statutes, that acquiescence seems to be built on a faulty assessment
of the law. Not only was the HHS analysis built on the assumption that there would not be many
factual instances in which a record held by the government would fall under the purview of both
HIPAA and FOIA when there appears to be many factual instances in which the two statutes
could conflict, but also the HHS analysis failed to consider the possible argument for an implied
repeal of FOIA by HIPAA and the circular deference problem between HIPAA's "required by
law" language and FOIA Exemption Three as explained in this Article.
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freedom of information laws. 9 Some of this confusion involves records that
this Article argues are most likely to cause conflict between the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and HIPAA: statistical records of medical
incidents and records of deceased individuals.'
0
HIPAA, and the regulations that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) have promulgated to implement HIPAA,11 do not allow certain
medical providers to release medical records. 12 When those same records are
deemed open for public inspection under a state or federal records law, records
custodians at government agencies that fall under the HIPAA definition of
"health care providers"' 13 may not know which disclosure law controls.
Even more confounding for records custodians at federal agencies is the
circular deference problem created by HHS regulations that implement
HIPAA's record closure requirements,' and the federal FOIA. 15 The HHS
regulations contain an explicit exemption to HIPAA's mandated closure of
access to medical records when those records are deemed open by another law,
such as FOIA.16  FOIA, in turn, allows agencies to deny public access to
records if another statute requires disclosure of those records, such as HIPAA
and the HHS regulations promulgated under HIPAA. 17  Because both laws
9. Three state attorneys general have been asked to explain how HIPAA affects state open
records laws. See Ky. Att'y Gen. 04-ORD-143 (2004) (detailing how city police and city
attorneys were incorrect in their belief that HIPAA controlled access to police records involving
persons that received medical treatment); 04018 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (2004) (responding to a
request by the Director of the Department of Health and Human Services, Finance & Support to
clarify whether HIPAA or Nebraska law governs public access to death records); Tex. Att'y Gen.
ORD-681 (2004) (responding to questions from a Texas Senator about the intersection of the
Texas public records law and HIPAA).
10. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1187 (Ohio 2006)
(involving a request for citations by the Cincinnati Health Department for lead contamination that
a reporter wanted to use to track the incidence of lead paint poisoning in low-income housing);
Abbott v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.3d 648, 665 (Tex. App.
2006) (involving documents related to the incidence of sexual assault and abuse in facilities run
by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation); 04018 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen.
(2004) (involving death records).
11. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2007)).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2007).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(3) (2000).
14. See Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1187 (referring to the problem of "circular
reference"); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, A Reporters Guide to Medical Privacy,
http://www.rcfp.org/hipaa/main.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Reporters Guide to
Medical Privacy] (quoting Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1187) (same). This "circular
reference" problem may have been better characterized as "circular deference" as termed in this
Article, because the statutes actually defer-not refer-to the terms of the other statute.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
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defer to the terms of the other, records custodians and courts are faced with an
inability to determine which statute controls the public nature of the record.
This confusion has made its way into state court systems, causing at least
two states to reconcile the state's open records law with HIPAA. 18 The federal
court system has yet to face a case in which the interaction of FOIA with
HIPAA must be resolved, but such a case is surely on the horizon. This Article
argues that such a case should end much like the state cases have ended-with
a decision that finds that the HHS interpretations of HIPAA allow FOIA to
control.19 Although a federal court could find that HIPAA and the HHS
regulations impliedly repealed Exemption Six of FOIA, the FOIA exemption
that governs access to medical records, this finding is not likely because courts
disfavor implied repeal analysis 20 and there are several other choices the court
could make that would not force it to find an implied repeal of FOIA.
If the court does not entertain an implied repeal argument, it will next need
to look to the text of the statutes to determine if the statutes can be read in
concert. Because of the circular deference problem between these two statutes,
a court will have difficulty determining which statute controls on the face of
the statute and, consequently, will look to legislative intent to resolve the
conflict.21 The only indication of intent is found in the preamble of the 2000
regulations that implemented HIPAA, in which HHS indicates that FOIA
should control access to a record covered by HIPAA and FOIA. 22 Although
18. See Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1183-84 (finding that the Ohio public records
law controlled access to a record that fell under the terms of HIPAA and the HHS regulations
implementing HIPAA); Abbott v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212
S.W.3d 648, 665 (Tex. App. 2006) (ordering the release of a record under the Texas open records
law despite the record also falling under the terms of HIPAA and the HHS regulations
implementing HIPAA). These cases are discussed further in Part III of this Article, infra.
Conflicts between HIPAA and state law happen even outside of the state open records context. In
Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 2008), the Georgia Supreme Court found that HIPAA
preempted a state statute that allowed a patient's attorneys to speak to physicians regarding the
patient's condition outside of the presence of the patient, id. at 71-72.
19. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1187; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 663-64.
20. Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92
CAL. L. REv. 487, 488-89 (2004) (The article explains that "[implied repeal] arguments fail in the
face of another long-standing interpretive guideline, which advises courts to presume that such a
repeal was not intended and to reconcile the statutes if at all possible. This guideline, the
presumption against implied repeals, functions as an obstacle to application of the rule described
above. The presumption against implied repeals, unlike the later-enacted-statute rule, embodies a
poliey [sic] of hostility to the notion of statutory updating unless the legislature makes that
updating explicit. In its strongest form, the presumption amounts to a sort of clear-statement
rule-allowing for repeal only by express provision-that negates the very notion of an implied
repeal." (footnotes omitted)).
21. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:5, at 202-15 (7th ed. 2007).
22. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,482 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2007)) ("Uses
and disclosures required by FOIA come within § 164.512(a) of the privacy regulation that permits
[Vol. 58:333
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this intent was that of an agency and not the legislature, because the legislature
expressly delegated its authority to implement HIPAA to HHS, a court should
defer to HHS's regulation and its interpretation of its regulation contained in
the preamble to the rule.23 Based on this intent, a court will likely find that
FOIA controls this analysis.
This Article introduces the conflict between HIPAA and FOIA in Part II,
which explains the provisions of HIPAA and FOIA and the HHS regulations
that cover access to medical records held by the federal government. Part III
delineates the practical realities agency personnel will face when a record
request falls under both HIPAA and FOIA. Part IV of this Article highlights
how two states have dealt with HIPAA's conflict with state statutes to see how
those courts have resolved a similar conflict. Part V delves into the case law
interpreting Exemption Six of FOIA to conclude that HHS's assessment that
Exemption Six should not cause a conflict with FOIA is inaccurate. Finally,
this Article argues that a federal court should decide that public access to a
medical record held by a government health provider is dictated by FOIA's
Exemption Six instead of HIPAA and the HHS regulations. The clash of these
laws will not be resolved easily because of the potential for an argument of
implied repeal of FOIA's Exemption Six by HIPAA, the circular deference
problem between the two statutes, and the lack of a strong statement of
legislative intent indicating how Congress wanted this conflict to be resolved.
Although the HHS preamble, which notes that HHS believes FOIA should
control access to a medical record held by a government agency, may not be
the strongest indication of legislative intent, a court should follow HHS's
belief because it is the only reference to this conflict found in the record of the
discussions that leads to the creation of this body of law.
uses or disclosures required by law if the uses or disclosures meet the relevant requirements of the
law.").
23. When Congress expressly delegates its authority to implement a statute, as Congress did
in the text of HIPAA, courts give "controlling weight" to agency regulations "unless [those
regulations] are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also United States v. Morton,
567 U.S. 822, 834 (1984). Scholars disagree over the deference that should be given to an
agency's determination of a preemptive effect of a regulation stated in a preamble to the
regulation. Compare Alvin D. Lurie, Age Discrimination or Age Justification? The Case of the
Shrinking Future Interest Credits Under Cash Balance Plans, 54 TAX LAW. 299, 318 (2001)
(arguing that because the Court has accorded Chevron deference to an amicus brief, deference
would be extended to a regulation's preamble), with Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and
Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 727, 772 (2008) (arguing that a preamble should be
given no deference). However, because HIPAA and its accompanying preamble were the "fruit
of a notice-and-comment rulemaking," United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31
(2001), and Congress and the regulation itself are silent on which law should control in the event
of a conflict between HIPAA and FOLA, the court should defer to HHS's interpretation in the
preamble to its regulation that FOIA should control this conflict.
2009]
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II. HISTORY OF APPLICABLE HIPAA SECTIONS, HHS REGULATIONS, AND
FOIA PROVISIONS
24HIPAA was enacted in 1996. The main purpose of HIPAA was to allow
employees to take health coverage with them when they changed jobs.25 In
order to effectuate the transfer of health insurance, it is often necessary for
medical documentation to be transferred among many "health care
provider[s], ' 26 defined as "a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing
facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency,
hospice program, or . . . a fund,"27 "a provider of medical or other health
services... and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies."
28
In order to maintain the privacy of this information, Title II of HIPAA levees
significant monetary penalties against "a person" who releases any
documentation that could identify a patient to a third party. 29 Despite the fact
that HIPAA clearly closes access to records in the hands of government
"health care providers," there does not appear to be any mention in the
Congressional Record of any concern that HIPAA would conflict with the
federal FOIA. 30 HIPAA goes on to instruct HHS to create rules that make the
transfer of health care information among health care organizations more
efficient.
31
It took HHS several years, but in December of 2000, HHS finalized
regulations implementing HIPAA, commonly known as "The Privacy Rule."
32
24. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
25. See 142 CONG. REc. 21,497 (1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd); see also Tobi M. Murphy,
Comment, Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving from Illusory Voluntary Compliance
to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54 LoY. L. REV. 155, 166 (2008)
(citing Irwin M. Ellerin, HIPAA Update, in I LITIGATION AT SUNRISE: ASS'N OF TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AM. ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (2005)) ("When first
envisioned, . . . HIPAA had a singular goal of permitting employees to maintain their health
insurance when moving from one job to another.").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000).
27. Id. § 1395x(u).
28. Id. § 1320d(3).
29. Id § 1320d-6 (indicating that "[a] person who knowingly ... discloses individually
identifiable health information to another person ... shall ... be fined not more than $50,000,
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both").
30. Notably, Congress did consider the issue of how HIPAA would interact with state law,
because a recommendation provision of HIPAA indicates that HHS regulations promulgated
pursuant to HIPAA are not to supersede state law if the state law contains "more stringent...
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications." Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91, § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033-44.
31. See id. § 702(e)(3), 110 Stat. at 1943; id. § 2701(e)(3), 110 Stat. at 1959.
32. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000). Congress gave HHS up to forty-two months to draft regulations
implementing HIPAA. E-HEALTH BUSINESS AND TRANSACTIONAL LAW 71 (Barbara Bennett
ed., 2002) [hereinafter E-HEALTH BUSINESS]. It took HHS four years to publish an initial set of
[Vol. 58:333
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Those regulations did not become effective until April 14, 2001, 33 and entities
covered by the regulations had until April 14, 2003 (2004, for smaller health
plans), to comply with the Privacy Rule.34 The Privacy Rule gives further
definition to the type of information that would "identify" a patient by laying
out eighteen criteria agency personnel should consider before releasing a
document.35  Some of these criteria are obvious-names, social security
numbers, and addresses are all prohibited from being on a document that is
released to a third party. 36 Some criteria, however, are not so obvious, such as
the city or county in which the person resides. 37 The Privacy Rule also leaves
it to the discretion of the health care _provider to redact this information in
order to make these records releasable.
38
The Privacy Rule does allow for disclosure of identifiable medical records if
"disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is
privacy regulations, which commentators have blamed on 50,000 public comments that were
submitted to the agency while it was drafting the regulations. See id.
33. E-HEALTH BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 71. Much of this delay was because of a change
in presidential administrations and a technical amendment to the final regulations. Id.
34. Crystal Spivey, Breathing New Life into HIPAA 's UHID-Is the FDA's Green Light to
the VerichipTM the Prince Charming Sleeping Beauty Has Been Waiting For?, 9 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 1317, 1322 n.24 (2006).
35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2007). The Privacy Rule directs agencies that medical
records can be released if the following "identifiers" are redacted from the document:
(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street address, city,
county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three
digits of a zip code if [the zip code is populous;]
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89
and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages
and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) Telephone numbers;
(E) Fax numbers;
(F) Electronic mail addresses;
(G) Social security numbers;
(H) Medical record numbers;
(1) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) Account numbers;
(K) Certificate/license numbers;
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(0) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and




38. Id. § 164.514(b).
2009]
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limited to the relative requirements of such law." 39 Presumably, this provision
would defer to FOIA for records covered by FOIA.4 ° In the preamble of the
Privacy Rule, HHS indicated that it intended, through the Privacy Rule, to
"preserve access to information considered important enough by state or
federal authorities to require its disclosure by law," that HHS did "not believe
that Congress intended to preempt each such law," and that the Privacy Rule
was intended to "avoid any obstruction to the ... health care provider's ability
to comply with its existing legal obligations.
41
'
In the preamble to the Privacy Rule, however, HHS made it clear that it did
not feel this conflict would occur often.42 The agency pointed to Exemption
Six of FOIA and said that it was consistent with HIPAA.43 The preamble,
however, did admit that there may be a conflict between HIPAA and FOIA if
the record was that of a deceased patient because privacy rights die with a
patient,44 although the preamble noted that many courts have found that family
members can have a privacy right in the records of a deceased relative.45 Left
open, of course, is what happens with records of a deceased patient who has no
relatives or who dies within those jurisdictions where the privacy right of
relatives has not been recognized. Additionally, this declaration by HHS
fails to recognize that Exemption Six of FOIA has a caveat that the medical
records must be an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, 47 which is not
39. Id. § 164.512(a)(1).
40. See id. HHS certainly reads the provision that way. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
41. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,667-68 (Dec. 28, 2000).
42. In the Preamble to the Privacy Rule, HHS wrote, "[w]e believe that generally a
disclosure of protected health information, when requested under FOIA, would come within
FOIA Exemption 6," thereby allowing the agency to deny access to the record. Id. at 82,482. In
the Preamble, HHS also responded to summarized comments that it had received from the public
regarding a proposed version of the Privacy Rule. One of those comments noted the potential
conflict that could occur if a record is open to public access under FOIA but closed under
HIPAA. HHS responded, "[w]e disagree, however, that most protected health information will
not come within Exemption 6 of FOIA." Id. at 82,597.
43. Id. at 82,482.
44. Id. The Second Restatement of Torts indicates that "[e]xcept for the appropriation of
one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living
individual whose privacy is invaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INVASION OF
PRIVACY § 6521 (1976).
45. 65 Fed. Reg. at 82,597.
46. The right of privacy of a relative of a deceased is often called a "relational right of
privacy." Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emerging Jurisprudence and Legal Rebuke to
Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133, 150 (2006). This
area of the law is new, but has been growing since the U.S. Supreme Court recognized such a
right in Nat'7 Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). See Calvert, supra, at
135.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
[Vol. 58:333
Avoiding Circular Deference
language included in HIPAA or the Privacy Rule. Thus, HHS's assertion that
the FOLA and HIPAA are consistent may be overstated.
FOIA has been around much longer than HIPAA, the original version of
FOLA appearing on the books in the 1960s.48 FOIA requires all government
agency records to be open to the public49 unless they fall within the
enumerated exceptions.50 Exemption Six of FOLA does ostensibly cover the
medical records that are encompassed by HIPAA. 5 1 Exemption Six, however,
only requires closure of those records when they would cause an "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy," 52 a caveat not found in HIPAA or HHS's
interpretation of HIPAA. There is significant case law on Exemption Six,53
much of which indicates that a court must balance the public interest in
accessing records that show "what the[] government is up to",54 against any
privacy interest in the records in making a determination whether a record is
exempted from the reach of FOIA through Exemption Six.
55
Just like the Privacy Rule's "required by law" exception that allows other
laws to control the release of a record in the situation where HIPAA would
56have otherwise mandated closure of the same record, FOIA, in turn, has an
exception that allows other laws to control the closure of a record in a situation
where FOIA would have otherwise mandated release of the same record.57
FOIA Exemption Three allows agencies to close access to records if another
federal statute "establishes particular criteria for withholding" those records
from public view.58 This particular exemption is often criticized as a means by
which Congress can sneak FOLA exemptions into large pieces of legislation so
that access proponents are not on notice that an exemption to FOIA is on the
table during legislative discussions.59 Additionally, opponents of Exemption
48. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). President Johnson begrudgingly signed
FOIA into law on July 4, 1966. Nat'l Sec. Archive, Freedom of Information at 40 (July 4, 2006),
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 194/index.htm.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
50. Id. § 552(b) (2000).
51. Id. § 552(b)(6).
52. Id.
53. See Developments in the Law--The Law of Media, supra note 7, at 1065 & n.73 (citing
U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976); Sherman v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 244 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2001);
N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
54. U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (quoting
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See id.
56. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1) (2007).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
58. Id.
59. E.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Cornyn Introduce New
OPEN FOIA Bill on Eve of Sunshine Week (Mar. 12, 2008), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/
2009]
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Three argue that agencies can point to language in a statute as a basis to
withhold documents generated under it, although that language may not have
been intended by Congress as "criteria for withholding." 60 Senators Leahy and
Comyn have introduced several bills in the Senate over the last three years to
fix loopholes in FOIA that allow the government to withhold records from the
public.61 Just in the last year, one of Leahy and Comyn's bills succeeded in
becoming law, but the provision that would have removed the "criteria"
language was negotiated out of the bill before it was passed.62  In response,
Senators Leahy and Comyn proposed the OPEN FOIA Act of 2008, which
would require any statute that was to exempt records from FOIA to specifically
reference that intent in the text of the statute. 63 The OPEN FOIA Act of 2008
has been referred to a Senate committee; but even if it passes, the text of the
bill does not appear to make the law retroactive. 64 Consequently, as the law
stands, the criteria language remains, and could feasibly allow, agencies to
deny access to any record HIPAA deems closed.
III. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN HIPAA AND FOIA
Although HIPAA was largely contemplated as a law that would affect
private health care providers, federal agencies do fall under the definition of
"health care provider" in many contexts.65 At the federal level, health care
providers include hospitals that treat military personnel and agencies that
collect medical data for statistical purposes, such as HHS, the Centers for
Disease Control, and the National Institutes of Health.6 6 There are potentially
200803/031208c.html ("The consequence of [burying FOIA exemptions in long bills] is the
erosion of the public's right to know and the shirking of Congress' duty to fully consider these
exemptions."); see also Posting of Rebecca Car to The Secrecy File, http://www.cox
washington.com/blogs/content/shared-blogs/washington/secrecy/entries/2008/03/12/cornynleahy_
introduce new foia.html (Mar. 12, 2008, 14:39 EST).
60. See The Media's Problems with FOIA, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Winter 2007, at
6.
61. OPEN FOIA Act of 2008, S. 2746, 110th Cong. (2008); OPEN Government Act of
2007, S. 2488, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (enacted); OPEN Government Act of 2005, S. 394, 109th
Cong. (2005).
62. 153 CONG. REc. S 15,650 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
63. OPEN FOIA Act of 2008, S. 2746, 110th Cong. (2008).
64. See id; see also Library of Congress, THOMAS Bill Tracking Website for S. 2746,
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:s.02746: (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
65. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
66. HHS describes itself as "the United States government's principal agency for protecting
the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are
least able to help themselves." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS: What
We Do (Mar. 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.htmlU.
HHS indicates that it oversees more than three hundred programs, including health research
programs, programs for disease prevention, and "[c]omprehensive health services for Native
Americans." Id. Many of these programs work with state and local governments. Id. The
Centers for Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health are also overseen by HHS. Id.
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even more agencies that might have medical records for other reasons, like
NASA, which monitors the health of astronauts, 67 or the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, which maintains medical records of all federal prisoners. 68  In
addition, there are many equivalent state entities that could fall under the
definition of "health care provider," depending on what kind of records and
data those agencies compile.
69
The circular deference problem is perhaps the most troubling aspect for
agency personnel and the courts when attempting to determine if a record that
is covered by HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, and FOIA is open for public
inspection. HIPAA, of course, leaves HHS to implement the requirement that
medical records be kept confidential, which is what the Privacy Rule attempts
to cover.70 The Privacy Rule then directs agencies to not release records unless
another federal law requires disclosure. 7 1 FOIA, in turn, defers to HIPAA and
the Privacy Rule by indicating in Exemption Three that records should be
withheld from public view if another federal statute has developed "criteria"
for keeping records from public view, 72 which HIPAA has done with the help
of the Privacy Rule and its criteria for what constitutes an identifiable medical
record.7 3 This circular deference leaves agency personnel and the courts with
no real direction on what law to follow.
HHS has yet to explicitly direct agencies on how to deal with the fact
patterns that could truly be implicated by both statutes. HHS's discussion of
what agencies should do in the event of a conflict between HIPAA and FOIA
in the preamble to the Privacy Rule neglects to explain to agencies how to
resolve the issue of whether HIPAA or FOIA controls public access to records
of deceased patients with no relatives. 74 HHS has also failed to tell agencies
what to do when a record seeker requests statistical records that do not identify
individual patients by anything other than the city or county in which they live.
The Centers for Disease Control works with state and local governments "to monitor and prevent
disease outbreaks." Id. The National Institutes of Health is the U.S. government's chief medical
research department and is also under the rubric of HHS. Id.
67. REVIEW OF NASA's LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF ASTRONAUT HEALTH 9-10 (David E.
Longnecker et al. eds., 2004) (detailing NASA's efforts to monitor astronaut health in order to
better understand the effect of space on the human body).
68. AUDIT Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS' EFFORTS TO
MANAGE INMATE HEALTH CARE i (2008), available at http://usdog.gov/oig/reports/BOP/a0808/
final.pdf ("The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for confining federal offenders in
prisons that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and secure. As part of these duties, the BOP is
responsible for delivering medically necessary health care to inmates in accordance with
applicable standards of care.").
69. For an alphabetical list of the major state agencies governing health-related issues, see
U.S. State Health Agencies, http://www.ehdp.com/vitalnet/shas.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
70. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007); id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
74. See supra note 46.
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These are records that would be closed under HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, but
would be open under Exemption Six of FOIA because their release is unlikely
to be considered an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.,
75
Factual situations like these have not risen to a level of any reported court
action. The federal appellate courts have yet to deal with a document that
appears to fall squarely within the disclosure rules of FOIA, the closure rules
of HIPAA, and the Privacy Rule. Considering HIPAA's stiff monetary
penalties for violating its terms, it is likely that agency personnel making these
decisions are erring on the side of closure. 76 Although the federal courts have
not yet dealt with a conflict over the release of medical records under HIPAA
and FOIA, at least two states have been faced with this sort of agency
personnel confusion, and determined that the agencies erred in denying access
to the records in those cases. 77  If what has happened in the states is any
indication of what the federal judiciary should brace for, there will be a suit
shortly that requires the federal courts to reconcile these two statutes.78
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN HIPAA AND STATE OPEN RECORDS LAWS
Since HIPAA went into effect, two state courts have been faced with cases
involving records that seem to fall within the disclosure rules of a state open
records statute and the closure requirement of HIPAA.79 Ohio and Texas
courts have dealt with this issue and both found that the state open records law
prevails when pitted against HIPAA.80 Both cases were born out of a media
75. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(B), with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
76. See supra note 29. The day after President Obama was inaugurated, he issued a memo
to all executive department heads that directed agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of
disclosure" to "usher in a new era of open Government." Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009). Although this is
a laudable goal, the state of the current law still allows courts to fine an individual $50,000 for
failing to comply with HIPAA, whereas FOIA contains no mechanism for fining individuals who
do not comply with its terms unless the individual is refusing to comply with a court order. See 5
U.S.C § 552(a)(4)(G).
77. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1183-84 (Ohio 2006);
Abbott v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. App.
2006). The Kentucky attorney general also looked at a case in which a police department denied
access to police records by invoking HIPAA, and determined that the denial was not mandated
under HIPAA. Ky. Att'y Gen. 04-ORD-143 (2004).
78. See Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1187; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 659-60.
79. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1183-84; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 651. At least three
state attorneys general have also been asked their opinion on whether their state open records
laws conflict with HIPAA. All of these opinions have found that there is a conflict, but that the
state's laws ultimately control access to the record at issue. The Texas and Nebraska Attorneys
General have found that the "required by law" language of HIPAA defers to their state open
records act. See 04018 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. (2004); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-681 (2004). The
Kentucky Attorney General found that the agency at issue-a city police department-was not a
"covered entity" under HIPAA and therefore HIPAA did not apply to the record. Ky. Att'y Gen.
04-ORD-143 (2004).
80. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1183; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 651.
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request for a document from a state government agency that was routinely
granted prior to HIPAA, but was denied in these instances because of
HIPAA. Although a conflict between state law and federal law includes
federalism considerations that would not be at issue in a conflict between two
federal laws, the Ohio and Texas cases are illuminating for purposes of this
Article because they happen to include the very factual circumstances that will
likely cause problems between the federal FOIA and HIPAA-a request for
statistical information of medical occurrences within a city or state.82 The
Texas decision involves a law that defers to HIPAA in a manner similar to
FOIA.
83
The Ohio court was faced with the issue of a request for statistical
information from a state agency that fell within the terms of HIPAA and the
Ohio Public Records Act. In 2004, Cincinnati Enquirer reporter SharonCoolidge was ursuing a story on children whose blood tests showed high
8Pusigo 86
levels of lead.8  These children happened to live in low-end rental housing.
The Cincinnati Health Department sent out notices to property owners stating
that the unit they lived in "ha[d] been reported to [the] department as the
residence of a child whose blood test indicate[d] an elevated lead level. 87 The
report detailed not only the lead contamination found at the property and how
the owner should abate the concern, but also included a general reference to
the fact that a child at that residence tested high for lead. Coolidge wanted
the Health Department to release 343 lead citations and any other reports it had
issued over the previous ten years. 89 The Health Department did not comply
with Coolidge's request, and based its refusal on HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule. 90 The Enquirer filed a mandamus action, requesting that the court
compel the records' disclosure pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act.9 1 The
court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus, and reasoned that even though
"'the lead-investigation reports are public records generated as a result of the
health department's mission in the community,' [the Health Department] had
established 'an exception to disclosure' of the records because they contained
"'reference[s] to blood test results for children currently residing at particular
81. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1184; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 651.
82. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1181; Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 648.
83. See Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 652.
84. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1183-84.
85. Id. at 1184.
86. Sharon Coolidge, The Toxic Effects of Lead: One Family's Story, CIN. ENQUIRER, June
25, 2006, at E4 [hereinafter Coolidge, Toxic Effects].
87. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
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addresses."' 92  Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in this case, the
Health Department did release citations that went to multi-family residences,
which amounted to about half of the citations issued, because no citation could
be tracked to any individual unit, and therefore not to any identifiable
patients.93 But the department continued to withhold citations that went to
single-family dwellings.94 The Supreme Court of Ohio decided that the Health
Department should have released all the lead citations because one "mere
nondescript reference to 'a' child with 'an' elevated lead level" was not
protected health information under HIPAA.95 The Ohio Supreme Court went
further and opined that even if the reports contained protected health
information, they still would have been open to public inspection.96 The court
noted a "circular reference" problem between the Ohio Public Records Act and
HIPAA.97 While the Privacy Rule indicates that the Health Department can
release protected health information if "disclosure is required by law," the
Ohio Public Records Act exempts from disclosure documents closed by federal
law.98 The court focused on the intent behind the passage of HIPAA and case
law that interpreted the Ohio Public Records Law to resolve the conflict. 99
Because HHS indicated that Congress did not intend to supersede any existing
disclosure laws, such as the Ohio Public Records Act, and because Ohio case
law required that a record be made public if there was any doubt if it fell
within the terms of the Public Records Act, the court decided that the record
would be open if it fell within the terms of both statutes.100
Although the legal battle took two years, Coolidge was finally able to
publish her article in 2006.101 Her story consisted of a five-page special
92. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Adcock, C-040064, 2004 WL 3015329,
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004)). In Ohio, a party that has been denied access to a
government record may seek redress by filing a writ of mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas,
Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court of Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(C)(1)
(LexisNexis 2007). It appears from the text of this case that the Cincinnati Enquirer initiated this
writ in the Court of Appeals. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1184.
93. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1184.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1185-86.
96. Id. at 1186.
97. Id. at 1187; see also supra note 14 (explaining circular deference as opposed to
reference).
98. Id. at 1186-87 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 1187.
100. Id. at 1187-88 (citing Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. The Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Ohio 2005)); see also Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. The Buckeye Ranch, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 2d 877, 879, 889-90 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that records of the treatment of a
mentally ill patient that were open under the Ohio Public Records Law, were not closed under
HIPAA because the "required by law" exception allowed the Ohio Public Records Law to control
the disclosure of the records).
101. Sharon Coolidge, Lead's Dangerous Legacy, CIN. ENQUtRER, June 25, 2006, at Al
[hereinafter Coolidge, Lead's Dangerous Legacy].
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section in the Sunday edition of the Enquirer.10 The special section focused
on several families whose small children had suffered lead poisoning in low-
end housing, but could not afford to get out of the lead contaminated housing,
and the failure of the Housing Court to make the landlords of these properties
abate the lead paint. 10 3 Two days after the article was published, the Mayor of
Cincinnati demanded change and the health department began investigating
and demanding clean up of all of these properties.'
0 4
A Texas court has also looked at the intersection of a state open records act
and HIPAA and came to the same conclusion as the Ohio court in the
Cincinnati Enquirer case-that the "required by law" language means that
HIPAA does not preempt the state open records law. 1 5 In Abbott v. Texas
Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, a reporter for a Dallas
TV station 1° 6 sought access to statistical reports held by Texas's Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation.' 0 7 Specifically, the reporter requested
statistics involving the allegations of abuse and the investigations of those
allegations, including the name of the facility at which the abuse allegedly
occurred, and the date on which it occurred.1l 8 The department handed over a
statistical report that indicated information about allegations and
investigations, but did not tie those incidents to specific facilities. 09 Pursuant
to the Texas Public Information Act, the department sought the opinion of the
Texas Attorney General for whether statistics tied to specific facilities would
violate HIPAA. 11° The attorney general opined that the records were open
under the Texas Public Information Act and because of the "required by law"
language in the HHS regulations, the required release of the document would
not violate HIPAA."'I Although the Texas law does exempt information from
being disclosed that is "confidential by law," creating a circular deference
problem between the two statutes, much like FOIA and HIPAA, the attorney
general reasoned that a record does not become "confidential" simply because
102. Id.
103. Id; see also Coolidge, Toxic Effects, supra note 86.
104. Sharon Coolidge, Records Battle: Challenge to HIPAA Over Lead Records Results in
Court's Groundbreaking Ruling, http://frontier.cincinnati.com/blogs/footnotes/ireleadstory.pdf
(last visited Mar. 4, 2009). In a section of the Cincinnati Enquirer's website devoted to reporter
blogs about how they developed a story, Coolidge detailed the record battle that she went through
to get access to the lead reports that formed the basis of her story, and the swift government
response to the story. Id.
105. Abbott v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.3d 648, 664-65
(Tex. App. 2006).
106. See Reporters Guide to Medical Privacy, supra note 14 (noting that Abbott involved a
Dallas television station).
107. Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 651.
108. Id. at651-52.
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it falls within the terms of HIPAA or the Privacy Rule."l 2 The department sued
the attorney general's office, arguing that this opinion was incorrect. 113 The
trial court agreed, finding that the documents were exempted from the Texas
Public Information Act because they were "confidential"; however, this
decision was overturned by the Texas Court of Appeals. 114  The court of
appeals began its opinion by questioning whether the information was even
"protected health information" under HIPAA because it did not have any
identifiable information about individual health records."15  The court
continued its analysis based on the assumption that the information was
"protected health information" because that issue was not fully briefed by the
parties. 16 The court noted that the "required by law" exception seemed to
encompass the Texas Public Information Act, thereby making the record open
under the act absent an exception. 117 Furthermore, the court agreed with the
attorney general that the record did not become "confidential by law" under
HIPAA, thereby skirting the circular deference problem. 118 Additionally, the
Department of Mental Health looked at the language in the HHS preamble that
indicates that Exemption Six of FOIA-the exemption that HHS indicated in
its regulatory preamble-would cover the same records HIPAA covers, and
wrote that because the intent of the Texas law is the same the court should find
that medical records are exempted as the preamble indicates; but the court
refused because it found that the request was not for an individual's records.
119
The Texas court also looked at both the language of the HHS preamble that
indicated HHS did not believe Congress intended to preempt any state laws
through HIPAA, and the public interest in disclosing abuse or neglect at a
mental hospital, and the court found that its opinion properly balanced these
two interests.12
0
Although Texas and Ohio are the only two states with reported cases
involving a perceived conflict between HIPAA and state open records laws,
121
there are surely more states that will face similar decisions. Whether those
states follow Ohio and Texas might largely be determined by the strength of
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id at 652-53, 664.
115. Id. at655.
116. Id. at 657. Implicit in this statement from the court is that it may have ruled that these




120. Id. at 662-63.
121. A case out of Louisiana, Hill v. East Baton Rouge Parish Department of Emergency
Medical Services., 925 So. 2d 17 (La. Ct. App. 2005), dealt with a record covered by HIPAA and
the Louisiana public records law, but the court found that both laws exempted the records from
public view; thus, there was no conflict between the two statutes, id. at 21, 23.
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the state's open records law.' 2 2 Both Ohio and Texas have laws that place
considerable emphasis on public access to government records and both states
have significant case law recognizing the importance of public access to
"records.123 Whether states with weaker public access laws follow Ohio and
Texas remains to be seen, but there is a long history of case law at the federal
level that interprets the intent of FOIA much in the same way as the Ohio and
Texas cases-that public disclosure is an important right that must be weighed
against other rights. 124 This history should cause a federal court to consider thelaw in a manner similar to the Ohio and Texas courts.
V. CASE LAW INTERPRETING EXEMPTION SIX TO THE FEDERAL FOIA
HHS claims that the "medical records" provision of Exemption Six of FOIA
would exempt from FOIA all records covered by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule.
A careful review of the case law does not bear this out.
According to the HHS explanation of identifiable records, any record that
does not redact someone's name, social security number, address, zip code,
city, or county designation, among other criteria, is exempt from public
disclosure. 25 Any agency personnel who discloses such information faces stiff
penalties. 126 Exemption Six, however, gives agency personnel discretion to
withhold medical documents from public view because the standard it specifies
for withholding the documents is one that would be a "clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."' 27 Although Exemption Six does not focus on
whether the documents identify an individual like the HIPAA regulation does,
it can be presumed that, similar to HIPAA, releasing a document constitutes an
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" if a reader can identify the
individual whom the document relates to. Based on this language, courts have
leeway under Exemption Six to find that documents listing only city or county
122. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ohio 2006);
Abbott, 212 S.W.3d at 651.
123. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE:
OHIO (2006), http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/item.php?t=-full&state=OH&level=F1 (indicating that
Ohio has a history of public access laws that date back to 1787 and a long history of cases that
"recognize[] that unrestricted public access to governmental records was one of the elements
distinguishing American government from the government of England"); REPORTERS COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, OPEN GOvERNMENT GUIDE: TEXAS (2006), http://www.rcfp.org/
ogg/item.php?t=-full&state=TX&level=FI ("Texas has a rich political heritage, one which has
historically demonstrated a strong commitment to the free flow of information and open
government.").
124. For further discussion of weighing public disclosure against other rights, see generally
Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict Between
Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, I I COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 71 (2003), and Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The
Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 (2008).
125. See supra note 35.
126. See supra note 29.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
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designations do not identify an individual, and would not trigger an
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." In addition, courts have
interpreted the "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" language as calling
for a balancing test between the public's right to know and the privacy interests
of the individual at issue in the document, which is not a test that HIPAA
invokes. 128  Probably the most striking difference between HIPAA and
Exemption Six is that HIPAA requires closure if a record falls within its
terms, 129 while Exemption Six makes closure discretionary if a record falls
within its terms. 130 Because of these differences, it is likely that records that
fall under HIPAA will not fall under Exemption Six, confusing agency
personnel over which statute to follow.
A few federal appellate court cases highlight the differences between the
considerations over disclosure of medical records under Exemption Six and
closure of those same records under HIPAA. In Dobronski v. FCC, the
plaintiff requested sick and vacation leave records of an FCC official.' 3' The
FCC believed the request should be denied under Exemption Six.13 2
Dobronski argued that the public had an interest in investigating whether a
government official is taking unwarranted sick and vacation leave. 33 The
court used a four-part balancing test to determine if the records were an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy: "(1) the plaintiffs interest in
disclosure; (2) the public interest in the disclosure; (3) the degree of the
invasion of personal privacy; and (4) the availability of any alternate means of
obtaining the requested information."' 34 The court noted that there was little
privacy interest in the sick leave records because the records only indicated the
employee's name, social security number, and the date that sick leave was
taken, but contained no indication of the actual sickness the leave was taken
for.' 3 5 Additionally, the court determined that the information could not be
found any other way.136 Because the public interest in knowing whether a
government official is taking unwarranted sick and vacation leave largely
outweighed the privacy interest, the court held that the records were not closed
128. See, for example, McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993), as a court
setting forth the test for determining whether the release of a record would be an unwarranted
invasion of privacy as "a balancing of the public interest served by disclosure against the harm
resulting from the invasion of privacy. In striking this balance, the court must keep in mind that
there is a presumption in favor of disclosure." Id. at 1251-52 (quoting I.B.E.W. Local Union No.
5 v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1988)).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2007).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
131. Dobronski v. FCC, 17 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1994).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 278 (citing Multnomah County Med. Soc'y v. Scott, 825 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir.
1987)).
135. Id. at 279.
136. Id. at 280.
[Vol. 58:333
Avoiding Circular Deference
by Exemption Six. 137  Perhaps this particular record would not have been
covered by HIPAA because the FCC would not be considered a "health care
provider" under HIPAA, but the Dobronski case does emphasize the different
considerations between the requirements of HIPAA and Exemption Six. Had
this record been held by a government entity that would be deemed a "health
care provider" under HIPAA, there is no indication that the analysis of
Exemption Six would be any different.
To be sure, there are cases where the court has found that the amount of
identifying information in a medical record does cause the release of the record
to become an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'138 In these cases,
however, the court still weighs that privacy interest against the public
interest, 139 which is a balancing test that HIPAA and the Privacy Rule do not
require agency personnel to consider when deciding whether to release a
record. Additionally, based on the Dobronski case, the court can find that
records containing identifying information, which HIPAA would require to be
closed from public view, are open under Exemption Six.
14 0
The case law on the privacy rights involved when the person identified in the
records is deceased is inconsistent, which does not bode well for documents
regarding deceased persons not creating a conflict if they are covered by both
FOIA and HIPAA. In McDonnell v. United States, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that if the subject of a record is deceased, "the Government
must assert some privacy interest other than the individual's interest in keeping
this personal information from public view in order to justify continued
withholding of the requested information."' 1
Probably the biggest difference between HIPAA and FOIA is the very nature
of the presumption behind each statute. FOIA was created with a presumption
of disclosure. If a court finds that the call is fifty-fifty on disclosure, the
FOIA case law indicates that the court should err on the side of disclosure.
143
Additionally, the terms of FOIA make exemptions permissible, but not
137. Id.
138. E.g., Whitehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 997 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding that Exemption Six barred disclosure of any records showing the outcome of evaluations
made for patients claiming worker's compensation by a particular group of doctors because the
public interest in an attorney obtaining the records for discovery purposes was low in comparison
with the invasion of personal privacy, because these medical records were easily identified with
individual patients).
139. Id. at 174-75.
140. Dobronski, 17 F.3d at 279.
141. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 1251-52 (finding that "'the court must keep in mind that there is a presumption in
favor of disclosure' when balancing the public interest against the privacy interest in a release of
a record (quoting I.B.E.W. Local Union No. 5 v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87,
89 (3d Cir. 1988))).
143. Id. at 1252 ("'[T]he agency bears the burden of proving an exemption from the
disclosure requirements."' (quoting I.B.E. W. Local Union No. 5, 852 F.2d at 89)).
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mandatory. 144 Agency personnel have discretion to decide to release the
document despite a FOIA exemption. 145 Under the terms of the FOIA statute,
the only situation in which agency personnel can incur penalties under FOIA is
if they fail to disclose a record after a court has ordered them to do so.
146
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, on the other hand, were written with a
presumption of closure. 147 If the medical records at issue identify someone by
containing any of the criteria listed by HIPAA, HIPAA requires that the record
be closed to public access. 148 Agency personnel run the risk of fines if they do
not comply with HIPAA-mandated closure.
149
VI. HOW THE COURT WILL RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
A threshold issue for any court looking at a FOIA-HIPAA conflict is
whether HIPAA impliedly repealed Exemption Six of FOIA. There are two
options for the court when considering this argument: find that HIPAA
impliedly repealed Exemption Six of FOIA or that the "required by law
exception" allows HIPAA to work in conjunction with FOIA. The foundation
of the implied repeal doctrine appears to relate to the theory that, occasionally,
Congress intends to repeal a previous statute, but either did not know the
statute existed or did not draft the new statute correctly to indicate its intent.
150
Because a court can glean the intent of Congress to repeal the former statute
from the text of the latter statute, or the debate that went into the formation of
the latter statute, a repeal of the former statute is appropriate and intended. 151
Like many statutory interpretation tools, courts seem to invoke an "implied
repeal" analysis in an ad hoc fashion. Some courts have entertained "implied
repeal" arguments, finding that the last word of the legislature on a subject
should be considered the true intent of the legislature.' 52 This analytical tool is
sometimes referred to as the "later-enacted-statute rule" and finds its roots in
Roman law. 153 This rule indicates that when the legislature creates a statute
that conflicts with a previous statute, the court should find that the latter statute
controls, even if the legislature never expressly indicated that the latter statute
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
145. This discretion is influenced by the directives of the current presidential administration.
See supra note 76 (regarding the directives issued to agencies by President Obama).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G).
147. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2007).
148. Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
149. See supra note 29.
150. Petroski, supra note 20, at 488.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 488 & n.4.
153. Id. at 500 & n.58. Petroski notes that the Roman versions of the rule can be found in
THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 13, 15 (Alan Watson ed., 1985). Petroski also points to Dr. Foster's
Case, (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1222, 1231 (K.B.), as the origin of the rule in English law. Petroski,
supra note 20, at 499-500 & nn.56 & 58.
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should supersede the former. 154 Of course, despite the impartiality implicit in
the use of most rules of statutory interpretation, the use of "implied repeal" or
the "later-enacted-statute rule" has been roundly criticized as being open to
significant judicial interpretation, which allows the court to appear to be rigidly
and formalistically applying a rule when the court is actually exhibiting
judicial activism.1 55  The "implied repeal" analysis is particularly open to
judicial interpretation because the court must find that two statutes do, in fact,
conflict, and cannot be read as coexisting, in order to find that the later-enacted
statute controls.' 56  This criticism dates back to a mid-seventeenth century
treatise that advocated for a judicial presumption against using the "implied
repeal" analysis because the wisdom of the legislature requires the court to
endeavor to read statutes together in the absence of expressed repeal. 57 This
argument is based on a concern over judicial encroachment on an essential
function of the legislature. If the legislature wanted to repeal a statute, the
reasoning goes, it would do so explicitly. 158 The court interpreting a repeal
when none has been expressly stated by the legislature would be in violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.' 
59
This presumption against using an "implied repeal" analysis continued in
American courts after the United States seceded from England. 160 But over the
years, American courts began to use the "implied repeal" analysis, or the
"later-enacted-statute rule," more and more frequently, sometimes not even
referencing the presumption against its use. 16 1 By the late nineteenth century,
American courts began to broaden the "implied repeal" analysis by permitting
the implied repeal of a prior-enacted statute if the new statute showed162 ,,,
legislative intent to repeal it. The "implied repeal" analysis has continued to
alternate between an oft-used statutory interpretation method to a maligned,
and often avoided, tool of activist judges.' 63 Beginning in the 1980s, however,
the Supreme Court began straining to avoid using the "implied repeal" analysis
by narrowing the scope of the text of a statute in order to avoid conflict with a
154. Petroski, supra note 20, at 499-500 & n.58.
155. Id. at 498-99 & n.54.
156. Id. at 498.
157. Id. at 500 ("[lt must be known, that forasmuch as Acts of Parliaments are established
with such gravity, wisdom, and universal consent of the whole realm, for the advancement of the
commonwealth, they ought not by any constrained construction out of the general and ambiguous
words of a subsequent Act, to be abrogated [but] ... ought to be maintained and supported with a
benign and favourable construction." (quoting Dr. Foster's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1232)
(alterations in original)).
158. Id. at 496.
159. See id. at 489.
160. Id. at 501-02.
161. Id. at 503.
162. Id. at 504.
163. Id. at 506.
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previously enacted statute. 164 For instance, in the 2003 case of Branch v.
Smith, Justice Scalia found that no conflict existed between two clauses of a
statute regarding the reapportionment of congressional districts. 165 The statute
addressed the procedure for when a federal reapportionment of congressional
representatives would leave a state with more districts than representatives.
1 66
One section of the statute indicated that the state should immediately
reapportion the districts and another said that the representatives should be
elected by the entire state until redistricting could be accomplished. 67 Justice
Scalia's attempt to reconcile the two subsections was so elaborate that it
prompted Justice O'Connor to refer to his efforts in her opinion as "tortured
judicial legislation."'' 68
Despite the distaste of some Supreme Court Justices for the "implied repeal"
analysis, lower courts use it routinely, often citing reasons of practicality for its
use. As the American body of legislation continues to grow, legislators
cannot possibly be expected to know that a new law may conflict with a
previous law, especially if the law is obscure. Because the later-enacted
statute is the best evidence of the current intention of the legislature and its
electorate, that law should control even if the legislator did not find an obscure
and dated law that happened to conflict with this new statute. 17 1 Although the
use of "implied repeal" is checkered, one tenant of the analysis remains
throughout its use in American jurisprudence-the text or the legislative
history of the latter statute must show the legislature's intent to repeal the
earlier statute by taking the law in a different direction.
172
Even if a court would entertain an "implied repeal" analysis of FOIA
Exemption Six by HIPAA, this strong evidence of legislative intent appears to
be lacking. In fact, there is no discemable mention of FOIA in the legislative
history. Congress explicitly granted the authority to promulgate regulations
implementing HIPAA's dictate to keep medical records from being released by
medical providers to HHS, 173 so it would be difficult to argue that HHS lacked
164. See id. at 516.
165. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273-75 (2003) (plurality opinion).
166. See id. at 266 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 266-67.
168. Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("It is far
wiser to give effect to the manifest intent of Congress than, as the plurality attempts, to engage in
tortured judicial legislation to preserve a remnant of an obsolete federal statute and an equally
obsolete state statute.").
169. See Petroski, supra note 20, at 516-18.
170. NORMAN J. SINGER, IA STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:9, at 457-58
(6th ed. 2002).
171. Id. § 23:9, at 469-70.
172. Petroski, supra note 20, at 491.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92 (2000) ("The Secretary, consistent with section 104 of the Health
Care Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, may promulgate such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this subchapter. The Secretary may
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authority to dictate that HIPAA's mandates on records access should be
considered secondary to other laws. When Congress enacts such an explicit
mandate, agency regulations are generally given deference by the Court,
especially if those regulations were promulgated pursuant to a notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure. 174  HHS even anticipated that an implied
repeal analysis would be conducted if the Privacy Rule conflicted with other
privacy statutes.
175
Indeed, before implied repeal fell out of favor with the Supreme Court, the
Court found in the 1975 case of Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. that
agency regulations did impliedly repeal a federal statute, even though the
Court acknowledged the presumption against finding such an implied repeal.
176
In Gordon, the Court found that an SEC regulation impliedly repealed a federal
antitrust statute. Because the agency had an expertise in the substantive area
covered by the regulation, the Court reasoned, Congress had placed its
confidence in the agency for regulation of this area of the law, and both
Congress and the agency had taken an active role in regulating this area of the
law.177 The opinion hinged on the concept that the agency regulations would
not function as Congress intended unless they impliedly repealed the
previously enacted statute. 78 Additionally, the Court noted that the repeal
should only repeal what is necessary to preserve the functionality of the
enabling statute for the agency action.1
7
The federal courts may entertain such an implied repeal argument, especially
the lower federal courts, which seem to be more amenable to the implied
repeal analysis than the Supreme Court. Despite its reluctance to use the
implied repeal analysis, the Supreme Court has still employed it in the past to
maintain the intended regulatory function of a federal agency.' The Court
could find that the Privacy Rule impliedly repealed Exemption Six of FOIA
promulgate any interim final rules as the Secretary determines are appropriate to carry out this
subchapter.").
174. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001). The Mead Court found
that Chevron deference should be given to agency regulations when Congress has made a clear
delegation of authority to an agency to make those regulations. See id. at 226-27. Additionally,
when an agency goes through a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, the court can use that
as evidence that Congress intended to delegate authority to make those regulations. Id. at 227-
30.
175. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,481-82 (Dec. 28, 2000) ("[W]e believe courts would apply the standard rules of
interpretation with regard to regulatory conflicts .... In some cases,... courts will find that the
later statute repeals the earlier statute by implication.").
176. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 685-87 (1975).
177. Id. at 689-91.
178. Id. at 691; cf Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (finding no implied
repeal of antitrust statute by SEC regulations because reconciling the conflict was the "proper
approach" in this instance).
179. See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685.
180. See Petroski, supra note 20, at 505-18.
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based on its decision in Gordon. Because HHS has an expertise in the
substantive area covered by the regulation, the Court could reason that
Congress has explicitly placed its confidence in the agency for regulation of
this area of the law, and Congress and the agency have taken an active role in
regulating this area of the law. Because of the disfavored nature of implied
repeal, however, this path seems unlikely and unwarranted, especially because
the Court has so many other, less controversial, paths it can choose.
Additionally, it seems antithetical for the federal courts to entertain an implied
repeal analysis that would find that HIPAA and the Privacy Rule impliedly
repeal Exemption Six of FOIA when state courts have refused to find that
HIPAA preempted state open records laws.
18 1
In addition to not finding implied repeal, the Court should find that implied
repeal is unneeded in order to allow HHS to do what HIPAA enabled it to do-
protect the privacy of medical records-because Exemption Six also seeks to
protect the privacy of medical records. 182  The rationale behind Gordon
suggests that a regulation cannot preempt a statute if the enabling statute for
the regulatory power can function without such a preemptory repeal.
183
Although FOIA protects the privacy of medical records differently than the
Privacy Rule, it does so because the medical records it controls are those that
happen to be within the control of the federal government. 184 Medical records
held by the federal government are different than medical records of other
"health care providers" because they often reflect what the "government is up
to," and public oversight of what the "government is up to" is an essential
tenant of FOIA and the case law that interprets FOIA. 85 Because of the extra
consideration of government oversight, FOIA requires the courts to balance
public disclosure against the privacy of medical records by determining if
release of the record is "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 186 This
standard is clearly different than the Privacy Rule standard, which prohibits the
release of any medical record, but the difference is appropriate because the
nature of the record-holder is different. Despite the difference in analysis
under FOIA, privacy is still considered as part of an agency's determination of
whether to release the records. Therefore, the court should find that allowing
FOIA to control this discrete part of the release of medical records does not
divest HHS from its ability to regulate the privacy of medical records in the
181. See the discussion of state cases in Part IV., supra.
182. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
183. See Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691.
184. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1).
185. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-
73 (1989) ("'The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government one of the
instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot
function unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up to."' (quoting EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
186. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993).
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hands of government "health care providers." The Privacy Rule continues to
control the release of medical records in the hands of all other "health care
providers."
When the federal courts take up the issue of the HIPAA-FOIA conflict,
there is no doubt that the controversial application of implied repeal analysis
will cause a court to pause. A court has the option to read the two statutes and
the regulation together, even if that reading creates the "tortured judicial
legislation" that Justice Scalia was criticized for in Branch.i8 7 The circular
deference problem could also prompt a court to engage in "judicial legislation"
to sort out which statute controls. Although the Ohio and Texas courts, in
analogizing to their state public records acts, found that the "disclosure
required by law" language covered Exemption Six of FOIA and agency
personnel must defer to FOIA in making decisions to release medical
records, those courts did not contend with the "criteria" language of FOIA.
Of course, HHS has determined that the Privacy Rule should defer to FOIA
because of the "disclosures required by law" language,' 9 but again, HHS does
not address the possibility of "criteria" language of Exemption Three, which
requires FOIA to defer to the closure requirements of HIPAA.
Authority on what a court should do in the case of circular deference like
that between HIPAA and FOIA is lacking. Courts often defer to legislative
intent to explain how the legislature intended the two statutes to interact or an
appeal to logic if the reading of one statute as referencing another would create
an "absurd" conclusion. 190 Unfortunately, neither one of these tenets of
statutory construction can guide a court in this situation, because Congress did
not address HIPAA in drafting FOIA and HIPAA did not exist when Congress
originally drafted Exemption Three of FOIA. In this situation, then, the next
logical step is for the court to compare the explicit discussion of the HHS
Secretary about deference to FOIA with a lack of discussion about deference to
HIPAA in any of the recent congressional discussions regarding amendments
187. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 292 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
188. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Ohio
2006); Abbott v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.3d 648, 659-60
(Tex. App. 2006).
189. HHS has not been completely consistent in suggesting that the Privacy Rule should
defer to other federal rules, because it has suggested that the courts should determine whether the
Privacy Rule has impliedly repealed previous federal statutes that involve privacy considerations
over government-held records. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,481-82 (Dec. 28, 2000). Although the main thrust of FOIA
is access, the exemptions contemplate privacy concerns; thus there is a likelihood that HHS may
make the implied repeal argument when a case is presented to the courts where the Privacy Rule
and FOIA conflict regarding whether a federal agency can release medical records.
190. E.g., H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Tennessee, 267 S.W.3d 848, 861 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008) (finding it only "common-sense" that the legislature would not require an "absurd"
reading of a statute to mean that "every contract for future services is one of insurance" in light of
a circular reference problem that would create such a reading of the statute.).
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to FOIA, including those that involved the decision not to alter Exemption
Three. If the court focuses on the global intent behind every legislature and
agency that has been involved in the drafting and amending of these three sets
of laws-HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, and FOIA-the only specific reference to
the opposing law in regards to access to medical records held by the
government is found in the preamble to the Privacy Rule and in HHS's official
response to questions about the interaction of FOIA and the Privacy Rule.'
9
'
In that specific reference, the HHS Secretary expresses an opinion that FOIA
should control a true conflict between the two statutes.' 92 A court looking for a
way to get off the merry-go-round of circular deference between HIPAA, the
Privacy Rule, and FOIA should use the HHS Secretary's express reference and
interpretation that FOIA would control a situation in which a record is covered
by both FOIA and HIPAA to determine that the regulations were, indeed,
intended to bow to FOIA if FOIA requires the medical record to be open to the
public.
VII. CONCLUSION
A conflict at the agency level between HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, and FOIA
Exemption Six is inevitable. There are many government medical providers
that routinely receive requests for medical records that, if released, would
provide valuable insight into the inner-workings of government. If such a
conflict makes its way to the courts, as with any records release problem, it is
largely a function of how badly the records-seeker wants the records.
A court looking at a case in which a medical record is sought from a federal
government medical provider has many options, most of which would allow
the court to read HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, and FOIA Exemption Six together,
but finding that HIPAA and the Privacy Rule defer to an Exemption Six
analysis when the medical records at issue are in the hands of the government
is a conclusion the court can reach if it chooses to avoid the circular deference
problem between the two statutes by looking to the legislative and agency
intent in drafting the laws at issue.'19 The only option that would allow the
Privacy Rule to control would be for the court to find that the Privacy Rule
impliedly repealed FOIA Exemption Six, which would be a controversial
stance for the court to take in light of the fact that implied repeal is a tool of
statutory analysis that is largely disfavored. 94 Accordingly, a court should
choose to read Exemption Six as controlling in a factual situation involving the
release of medical records in the hands of the federal government. Such a
decision is not only legally sound, but is sound public policy, given the
191. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 20.
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importance of government oversight that is pervasive through federal record
access law.'
95
195. See supra note 185.
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